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CORPORATIONs--DOING PROFESSIONAL SERvIcE THROUGH OTH-

ERS-The question whether a corporation empowered to engage in

any lawful business may furnish professional services to its members
or customers through the use of licensed agents has been a real problem for the courts. It is generally agreed that a corporation cannot
furnish professional services to the public generally through or by
means of employing licensed members of a profession for whose services it makes charges that go into the funds of the corporation; 1 but it
is equally well-settled that a corporation can engage in any lawful busi-

ness or trade .even though practitioners are required to be licensed,

i FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS,

§ 956.

§ 97 (1931); x3 AM. JuR. § 837; 19 C. J. S.
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provided that the corporation employs only licensed members of the
trade to do the actual work.2
Two basic reasons are advanced for the rule barring corporations
from the practice of professions. It is said that such practice would
result in the loss of the individual and personal employment relationship between practitioner and client; and it is further said that an impairment of professional ethics by a management interested in profit
would be a necessary result. The reason first stated issometimes given
in terms of control of the practitioner-client relationship by the corporation rather than by the professional agent. This analysis was stated
by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Cooperative Law
Company,' and has been repeated religiously by our courts ever since.
The issue before the court in M¢atter of Cooperative Law Company
was whether a business corporation, organized under a statute which
permitted business corporations to incorporate for any lawful purpose,
could lawfully furnish its subscribers legal advice and service including
collection work by employing a staff of licensed counsel. Finding no
statute permitting a business corporation to practice law, the court
rendered a well-written decision denying to a corporation the right to
practice a learned profession for the reasons stated above."
The issue has been dismissed on occasion with an observation that
a corporation cannot be of good character, possess educational requirements and professional skill-from which it is concluded that a corporation cannot practice a profession, because it cannot secure the required license for lack of the statutory qualifications. 5 It is submitted
that this oversimplifies the problem; because, in the absence of express
language to the contrary, it is just as reasonable to conclude that the
legislature, in setting out qualifications, realized that no corporation as
such could secure a license, and therefore did not intend that the
statute should apply to corporations. 6 In this field of law, recognition
of the corporate entity as a fiction of law is essential to valid reasoning.
This is true in spite of the well-known canon of consti-uction that the
word 'person' usually includes both corporate and natural persons.
All states have statutes controlling the practice of medicine, den2 6 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, § ? 518 (1931).

3 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
4For more complete statement see Matter of Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y.
479 at 483, 484, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); 37 MicH. L. Rxv. 961 (939).
5
Stern v. Flynn, I54. Misc. 609, 278 N.Y.S. 598 (1935); but cf. Dickson
v. Flynn, 273 N.Y. 72, 6 N.E. (zd) 102 (1937), where mandamus issued to compel

Secretary of State to issue certificate of incorporation .because articles submitted followed the statutory language exactly.
6
Binford v. Boyd, 178 Cal. 458, 174 P. 56 (1918); State Electro-Medical
Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905).
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tistry and law as well as a host of other occupations which are either
recognized as professions or as trades for which a license is required.
Over half of the states have embodied the prohibition against corporate practice of law in statute either by forbidding incorporation for
that purpose' or by making unauthorized practice of law by a corpordtion a misdemeanor.8 Everywhere a corporation is subject to quo
warranto or similar proceedings designed to facilitate restriction of
corporations to the powers granted by the state. These statutes are the
sole criterion for determining borderline cases; and, too frequently,
the statutes fail to state in clear language whether the legislature
intended to raise an occupation to the status of a profession or merely
require that members of that occupational group be licensed. Thus,
although there is little dissent from the general doctrine that a corporation may not engage in the practice of a profession through licensed agents or employees, the determination of whether the occupadon in a particular jurisdiction is a profession or merely a trade is
often a difficult question. Applicable statutes or reasonable inferences
from such statutes provide the only means short of judicial legislation
for a decision on this issue.
The avowed objective of almost all of our licensing regulation is
the protection of the public through the exercise of the police power.
That this objective may be obscured by the monopolistic hopes of members of a particular occupational group or that it may be caught in a
wave of anti-chain legislation is nicely illustrated by Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge' where the United States Supreme Court found violation of
due process and equal protection in a Pennsylvania statute which required all of the stockholders of corporations owning drug stores to be
licensed pharmacists. The Court found no real and substantial connection befween this legislation and the protection of public health, in
view of the fact that the State already had reasonable regulations
limiting the compounding of drugs to those licensed as pharmacists
and requiring persons in charge of drug stores to be licensed pharmacists. The Illinois Supreme Court expressed the same idea in these
7

1daho Code Ann. (1932)

§

29-IoZ;

Miss.

Gen.

Code Ann.

(94.?)

§ 8682; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 5903; Tex. Civ.
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1935) § 1302; N.Y. Stock Corp. Law (McKinney, 194o )
§ 7; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1938) § 8623-3; S.D. Code Ann. (939)

§

11.0201.
8 Ala.

Code Ann. (1940) tit. 46, § 42; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) c. 42,
§ 3630; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 411; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944)
c. 93, § 7; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 27, § 15; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929)
§ 10175; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 2, c. III, §§ 1-9; N.Y. Penal Code (McKinney, 1944) § 28o.
9 278 U.S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57 (1928).
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words: "The object of this statute was not to'protect architects merely
by limiting the work to those that possessed a license. The real purpose of the statute is the protection of the public against incompetent
architects, from whose services damage might result to the public by
reason of dangerous and improperly constructed buildings and by badly
ventilated and poorly lighted buildings." " Justice Mallery of the
Washington Supreme Court wrote an impressive dissent in a recent
case denying to corporations the right to engage in the practice of
optometry through licensed employees, posing the fundamental issue
-whether protection of the public interest or consolidation of monopoly position by individual optometrists was the objective of the
statute requiring licensing of optometrists in that state."'
The fundamental problem of statutory construction was raised in
State v. Winneshiek Cooperative Burial Association, 2 when the Iowa
court was called upon to decide whether a cooperative burial association engaged in furnishing a complete burial service to its members
was engaging in the practice of the profession of embalming or whether
it was doing a mercantile business as authorized by the corporation
act ' 3 and its articles. That court had previously decided that an undertaker was liable for sales taxes on sales by him of caskets and other
personal property sold with his services in connection with his business; '" and in another case that a cooperative association doing the
same kind of burial business without the limitation as to membership
required by the corporation act"' was engaged in unauthorized activity. 6 The statute requiring licensing of embalmers ",was susceptible
of two constructions; but an amendment to the same licensing act
specifically mentioned cooperative burial associations, 8 giving rise to
an inference of legislative recognition of their lawful existence. A
holding that embalming is a trade which can be-practiced by a cooperative association with membership restrictions consistent with the
legislative scheme was the result of a careful analysis of all of the
o People ex rel. State Board v. The Rodgers Co., 277 Ill.
151 at 155, 115 N.E.
146 (1917).
11 State on Relation of Standard Optical Co. v. The Superior Court for Chelan
County, 17 Wash. (zd) 323, 135 P. (?d) 839 (i943).
12 (Iowa 1946) 22 N.W. (2d) 800; 234 Iowa 1196, i N.W. (ad) 367

(19440.

'" Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) §§ 8459, 8486 providing for the organization of cooperatives for stated purposes including mercantile business.
1'Kistner v. Iowa State Board, Z25 Iowa 404, a8o N.W. 587 (1938).
'n Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 8494.
16 State v. Fremont Cooperative Burial Association, 2z2 Iowa 949,- 7o N.W.
320 (1936).
' 7 Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 2439, also § 2585.O1.
18 Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 2585.oi.
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statutes bearing on the question. The case provides an illustration of
both a frank recognition of the problem and a result consistent with
the legislative materials available.
The fundamental problem can be recognized in the interpretations
of judge-made and statute law dealing with the principal professions
and trades. An examination of law, medicine, and professions' recognized as such by statute as distinguished from licensed trades will be
undertaken for the purpose, of illustrating the manner in which the
courts have approached the problem.
The Practice of Law
As stated above, the orthodox principle is that a corporation may
not practice law even though its employees all are members of the
bar. The rule is sometimes stated that corporations cannot practice law
either directly or indirectly; but no necessity for barring direct practice by a corporation exists in view of the undoubted fact that a corporation as an artificial person is incapable of practicing any profession.
Yet it is notorious that trade associations, automobile associations, collection agencies, title companies, and trust companies have taken over
or shared with the profession many aspects of law practice. Corporate
fiduciaries are well-recognized today; and the preparation of wills
and trust agreements is certainly an aspect of their business as well as
a drafting task often performed by a lawyer. Save where a statute
specifically authorizes trust companies to draw such instruments, they
.are held to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law." In fact,
American courts have shown little liberality in permitting pprsons not
members of the legal profession to prepare legal documents or perform
other attorney's functions. The opinion in Matter of Cooperative Law
Company is a fair statement of the state of authority in American jurisdictions today, although some critics have pointed out serious questions
as to the validity of the assumptions and reasons the New York Court
used in reaching its conclusion.
Is it so clear that a 'law factory' or large partnership will maintain
the close personal relationship any better than will a small corporation? Is it not true that the trust department of a large bank is better
qualified to draw a will or trust indenture than is the average practitioner? Do not insurance company attorneys have a wealth of experience and know-how in negligence cases? On close analysis what true
objection can be found to membership corporations which furnish legal
9 In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, z88 P.

157 (1930);

People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344
Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 9o9 (93); Detroit Bar Association v. Union Guardian Trust
Co., z8z Mich. 26, 276 N.W. 365 (1937); io5 A.L.R. 1365 (936); BRAND,
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE DECISIONS, introduction (937).
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service in a restricted field to the members of a non-profit automobile
dub or property owners' association? Are not both the attorney-agent
and the corporation-principal presently subject to judicial discipline
which could prevent lowering of the standards of the profession? Does
not the experience of recent years with hospital corporations engaged
in the practice of medicine indicate that direct payment is not essential
to the professional relation? What real difference with respect to the
issue of divided loyalties is there between the position of salaried
employees of a law partnership and that of a salaried employee of a
law corporation? Does not recent experience in the field of administration of bankrupt's estates reflect an unflattering comparison of the relative worth of professional and corporate standards? Is it at all clear
that the public would not go as willingly to the experienced staff of a
law corporation as it now goes to the well-staffed hospital? These and
other similar questions have been addressed to the profession by,its
own membership
in recent years; and few of them can be answered
20
with assurance.
An answer to part of the problem lies in the hypothesis that the
experienced professional senior members of a reputable law partnership
are likely to insist on closer adherence to professional standards than
are the non-professional officers of a law corporation organized for
profit. There is merit in the view that an individual having a will or
trust agreement drafted in which the corporate fiduciary is to play the
role of executor or trustee should have the benefit of disinterested
professional advice. Some types of individual counselling are no doubt
better accomplished by an individual of unquestioned veracity whose
files are open to no one, than by one of many attorneys employed by
a law corporation.
Collection agencies have provided bar associations and courts with
a real problem in their field; because no court has gone so far as to
say that a bona fide assignment of a chose in action to a corporation
is void on its face in view of a likelihood that the collection agency
would threaten suit or bring suit to enforce the claim. It is difficult
to see any conflict in interest between the creditor-assignor and the collection corporation-assignee, although it may well be that the recalcitrant debtor would prefer to have the creditor rather than the collection corporation as his opponent.
The Iowa court dealt severely with a collection agent in Buimp v.
Barnett" enjoining any further advertising or solicitation of contracts
20Ashley, "The Unauthorized Practice of Law," 16 A.B.A. J. 558 (1930); I
LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics

547 (924);

Dawson, "Frankenstein, Inc.," 19 Am.

274 (1930); 34 COL. L. REV. 571 (934).
21 235 Iowa 3o8, 16 N.W. (2d) 579 (944).

MERCURY
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for legal services by an enterprising individual who advertised himself
widely as one able to collect bills and repossess automobiles. Barnett
handled his own cases in the justice courts; but employed counsel in
the circuit courts. He sent out impressive letters threatening suit unless
payment was promptly made; and decorated his correspondence with
lively jurats and other legal trappings. The court found as a matter
of law that his commission contracts with his assignors were champertous; and that in holding himself out as one particularly qualified to
render legal services incident to collection he had unlawfully engaged
in the practice of law.
In Nelson v. Smith " the Utah court granted that an assignment
of a chose in action even for purposes of suit gave the assignee a right
to bring suit; but found that a corporate collection agency which made
a practice of taking such assignments was doing so to evade the prohibition against corporate practice of law, and therefore should be enjoined, even though the agency had employed members of the bar to
prosecute its claims.
It is a well-known fact in the commercial world that certain corporations will prepare all necessary incorporation papers, and qualify
and maintain the necessary resident agents for a corporation to be
formed, yet there is little record of litigation to stop this practice of
law. The definition of practice of law in a particular case seems to depend in no small measure on the identity and business in which the
quo warranto or contempt defendant is engaged.
The Missouri court issued an opinion in State ex rel. McKittrick
v. C. S. Dudley & Co.23 which may be said to represent the weight of
authority today. The corporate collection agency is permitted to collect
debts for others provided that it does not employ an attorney or promise to employ one, or threaten the debtor with suit. Where collections cannot be made without suit, claims must be returned to the
creditor-assignor who will then be free to select his own attorney. The
writer submits that this decree is a neat emasculation of the collection"
agency as an effective means of compelling payment.
Trust companies and banks have had their share of defending their
activity in the borderland between law practice and the conduct of
business as a corporate fiduciary. The heart of the trouble is that will
drafting and the writing of trust agreements are activities which would
normally be implied powers for such corporations but for the prohibition against corporate practice of law. There is little deviation from
the view that no corporate fiduciary can hold itself out as competent to
draft wills and trust declarations, unless specifically authorized by
22

107 Utah 382, 154 P. (d) 634 (940)Mo. 852, ioz S.W. (?d) 895 (937).

23340
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statute.2" As indicated previously, there is a real argument in favor
of requiring a corporate fiduciary to abstain from drawing instruments
which name it as executor or trustee, for the patent reason that it has
an interest inconsistent with complete devotion to the professional duty
involved in drafting. Accepting this analysis, the Idaho court's holding in In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co.25 was correct in finding that a trust company which held itself out as specially qualified to
draw wills, mortgages, deeds, and contracts was engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
But there is serious doubt as to the wisdom of the decision of the
Illinois Court in People v. Association of Real Estate Tax-Payers2 6
holding that a non-profit corporation which represented its members in
tax matters through qualified attorneys was engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. The adverse interest in profit is absent here i and
analogy to non-profit medical insurance associations is close. Where
thei question is not controlled by statute, the view taken in Merrick
v. American Security & Trust Co.," that a corporation which carried
on a fiduciary business probating wills, giving advice in the management of estates and presenting elementary legal information to its
customers was not engaged in unauthorized practice of law, but was
performing services which were reasonably incidental and practically
necessary to the conduct of its authorized business, seems more reasonable. However, a more common decision is represented by the case of
Grand Rapids Bar Association v. Denkema28 rejecting the argument
made that an individual engaged in the insurance and real estate loan
business who appeared in court in probate matter in which he was not
administrator and prepared petitions and orders for the sale of realty
was doing work incidental to his business which in no way impaired
the proper administration of justice. A comprehensive consideration of
the trust company's proper field in relation to the practice of law is
found in the opinion in Detroit Bar A~sociation v. Union Guardian
Trust Company" where the Michigan court held that a trust company may not perform any act or draw any paper in connection with
the administration of estates in the probate or other court except those
acts and papers which are ordinary-or incidental services for which no
charge is made or fee clairm'ed. A number of courts are far less generous
than this in construing corporate fiduciary's powers and hold that the
People v. Peoples Trust Co., i8o App. Div. 494, i67 N.Y.S. 767 (917);
A.L.R. 1365 (1936); HIcKs, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw (1934).
25 See note 22, supra.
2G354 Ill. ioz, 187 N.E. 823 (i913).
27 (App. D.C. 1939) 107 F. (2d)
27i.
28 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (939).
29 See'note 1.9, supra.
24

IO 5
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drafting of a single instrument is unauthorized practice of law. It is
important to note here that all courts recognize the right of a business
corporation to employ counsel to advise and draft papers for the corporation; and that the litigation arises when the corporation is apparently engaged in selling legal services to its customers.
The case law in relation to automotive associations, property owners
associations, and collection associations is typified by the holdings in
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v: Chicago Motor Club 0 and
Re Maclub of America, Incorporated 1 -both of which cases found
that the legal services rendered by a staff of attorneys employed by
the motor clubs amounted to unauthorized practice of law by the corporations concerned. Surely here there is an absence of interest adverse
to the corporation's member-client.
No easy solution for this problem presents itself. To follow legislative direction when explicit, and to make reasonable deductions from
statutes when they are general, is as much as the courts can do. The
writer believes that reasonableness is evident in the Merrick case and
other decisions which recognize an overlapping of the proper functions of corporate fiduciaries and members of the legal profession.
Surely there is little probability of great damage to the public. A better solution than attempts at blanket legislation in this field is likely
to be found where local bar associations and local trust companies
reach agreement on the extent to which trust companies can exercise
implied powers without running afoul of the orthodox rule against
corporate practice of law. The decisions in the automobile association
and property owner's association cases can be defended only on the
ground that such holdings are the necessary result of careful, staiutory
construction, for the interest of the public appears to be secure without
judicial intervention against non-profit membership associations in this
field.
The Practiceof Medicine and Dentistry
It can be stated with confidence that a corporation organized for
profit cannot engage in the practice of medicine or dentistry, save
where the applicable statute dearly indicates a contrary conclusion.
The current of judicial opinion is exemplified by People v. United
Medical Service"2 where the court found that, although the corporation act permitted incorporation for any lawful purpose, a business
corporation could not engage in the practice of medicine because the
profession is restricted to natural persons qualified and licensed under
the statute. A department store which has a dental department is also 36z Ii. 50, i99 N.E.

I (i935).
31 z95 Mass. 45, 3 N.E. (zd) z7z (1936).
3236z
Ill. 44Z, zoo N.E. 157 (1936); 103 A.L.R. 1240 (936).
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most certain to be found to be unlawfully practicing dentistry, as is a
corporation which advertises guaranteed dental work, even though
both employ only licensed dentists."
A generally recognized exception to this rule is found in nonprofit hospital corporations whose practice of medicine through staff
physicians has the blessing of both the medical associations and the
courts."4 Medical associations have not chosen to extend their liberality
toward osteopathy or chiropractics; and, except where expressly recognized by statute, the charge of illegal practice of medicine is not uncommon. Group health associations and other membership corporations which furnish medical care to their members on an annual fee
basis have been under attack by the medical associations for a number
of years; but it appears that public acceptance of such corporations is
becoming general. This movement received encouragement in the
decision of the Supreme Court in American Medical Association v.
United States 5 which chastised organized medicine under the Sherman Act for conspiring to impede and block the activity of Group
Health, Incorporated, a District of Columbia chartered membership
corporation composed largely of government employees. The Court
made a specific finding that Group Health was engaged in trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act in furnishing hospital and medical
care to its members.
Some state legislation has been construed to permit corporations
to engage in X-ray, electrotherapy or Roentgenology where the activity is carried on under the direction of licensed practitioners of
medicine and surgery."8 Apparently the practice of medicine in Nebraska is open to members of the profession who wish to make use of
the corporiation as a method of practice; but even this departure from
the established norm is hedged by the requirement that the members
of the corporation be licensed physicians."
No objection to group or cooperative medicine has been advanced
which is premised on protection of the public; but the same arguments
against practice of law by corporations organized for profit apply with
equal or greater force to the practice of medicine or dentistry by corporations for profit. The employment of physicians to furnish medical
care to the employees of a business corporation or even contributions
38

State v. Bailey Dental Co., zix Iowa 788, 234 N.W.
v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N.Y. 244, 6o N.E. 597 (90).
'4 The attitude of the courts
tological Institute, 19z N.Y. 454,
35 317 U.S. 519, 63 S. Ct.
" Doumitt v. Diemer, 144

is typified by People v, John H. Woodbury Derma85 N.E. 697 (19o8).
3z6 (x943).

Ore. 36, z3 P. (2d) 918 (i933); State Electro-

Medical Institute i. State, 74. Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (905).

" See note 36, supra.

z6o (1931); Hannon
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to hospitals in the immediate area have seldom been questioned as anything but proper exercise of the implied powers of corporations.
Professions by Statute as Distinguished from Trades or Businesses
As indicated earlier, it is in this field of uncertainty and growth of
statute law that the courts have much difficulty in determining the
fundamental question as to legislative intent. The statutes generally
leave much to implication; and the question whether a particular
occupation has been elevated to the status of a profession or merely
made subject to the state's power to license for protection of the public
is one which must be solved by inference or deduction.
Some common law or constitutional right to engage in a trade or
calling exists in appreciable degree in the United States, although
progressive regulation of occupations formerly open to all without
license has been increasingly evident in the past half-century. Thus,
although a decision that a licensing regulation was an unreasonable
and arbitrary restriction on an undoubted constitutional right to engage
in a trade or calling was a common judicial utterance early in this
century, courts today are more inclined to be chary of holding a legislative. classification unreasonable for lack of relation to the public interest.
The interrelation in practice of the functions of optician and
optometrist has caused a wealth of legislation and decision on the
practice of optometry by corporations. The prevailing view is that a
corporation may properly engage in the retail sale of optical equipment, but it may not engage in the practice of optometry even though
only licensed optometrists are employed. " Nor have the courts been
easily misled by leasing or other contract arrangements between optical
companies and optometrists ostensibly independent who are in fact
employees of the optical company. 9 Other jurisdictions have taken a
contrary view on the basic issue and found that their licensing statutes,
either expressly or by implication, permit corporations to practice the
trade of optometry where only licensed optometrists are so employed."'
These decisions gain stature when one considers that the recognized
profession in this field is opthalmology. Reconciliation of jdidicial
opinion in this area is impossible save on the ground of differences in
3 State ex rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P. (2d) 995
(I935); Neil v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc., 330 Pa. 213, 199 A. 178 (1938); State
ex rel. Bricker v. Buhl Optical Co., 131 Ohio St. 217, z N.E. (2d) 6oi (1936);
Ioz A.L.R. 343 (1936); i8 A.L.R. 585 (940).
"9 State v. Kindy Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N.W. 332 (1933).
40 Kindy Opticians, Inc., v. State Board, 291 Mich. 152, 289 N.W. 112 (1939);
Silver v. Lansburgh & Brother, (App. D.C. 1940) III F. (zd) 518; State v.
Gus Blass Co., 193 Ark. 1159, 105 S.W. (ad) 853 (937); 141 A.L.R. 883 (1942).
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the statutes which the legislatures have provided for solution to the
problem. There is certainly much to be said for the view which permits
corporations to practice optometry through licensed employees as an
aspect of its optical business, where the governing statute does not
dearly indicate that optometry is a profession.
The courts which have considered the question of corporate practice of architecture have divided on the issue, some finding legislative
intent to permit none but licensed individuals to engage in the profession, others deciding that either express language or reasonable implications of statutory language would permit a corporation to engage
in the trade of architecture through licensed employees. The Illinois
court solved the problem by finding that the purpose of the licensing
statute was protection of the public rather than the architects.41 No
considerations of intimate personal relationships between the architect
and his client appear to render corporate practice objectionable. It is
clear that architecture like engineering is creative work; but it is not at
all clear that the public interest suffers when architects incorporate to
practice their calling.
The Winneshiek case is certainly a reasonable solution to the general problem in that it permits a cooperative corporation to engage in
a comprehensive funeral service business by employing a licensed embalmer to handle that part of its business. Other courts have reached
similar conclusions with respect to the extension of the same right to
corporations organized for profit, finding that embalming is a trade
often carried on in connection with an undertaking or funeral business.
Here as in the case of optometry and architecture the courts have been
less willing'to bar corporations from practice, influenced largely by the
fact that no real public interest is in issue which cannot be adequately
protected by a well-administered licensing statute.
Though Liggett Co. v. Baldridge included a dissent by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis on the ground that the question was ultimately
one for legislative rather than judicial action and that divorcing ownership and control of drug companies might be undesirable, it is the
established rule that a corporation may own and operate a drug store
provided that all pharmacal work is done by licensed personnel, and
sometimes subject to the proviso that active management must be
under the control' of a licensed pharmacist. Aside from the opposition
of various groups interested in limiting chain drug store operation, ho
real opposition to this principle is in evidence. As regards miany other
occupations including plumbing, carpentry, surveying, peddling and
auctioneering, the right of corporations to engage in such trades is not
often questioned, although it may be the case that the corporation it41

See note 17, supra.
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self cannot be licensed to engage in the trade as a 'person' under the
terms of the statute.42
In this field of professions by statute and licensed trades no universal formula can be found. Public dissatisfaction or satisfaction with
the existing state of affairs as it is reflected in licensing statutes is the
sole criterion available to the courts. A detailed consideration of the
statutes and decisions in a particular jurisdiction is likely to indicate
that the courts have been rather consistent in following the legislative
pattern as it develops.
General Considerations
In considering a solution to the general problem under discussion,
one thing seems relatively dear-responsibility for advance or change
in the existing general rule against corporate practice of professions
through licensed agents is on the legislatures. They alone define terms
generally and provide the courts with prohibitions or standards to administer in the interest of the public welfare. In the absence of a clear
manifestation of legislative purpose, the courts can give only a reasonable construction to the applicable statutes based on a prevailing policy
permitting persons, corporate and natural, to engage in any lawful
occupation or business. Any further inroads on this salutary principle
should not be undertaken in the absence of plain statutory language.
It is the opinion of the writer that the argument in favor of nonprofit mutual corporations' professional practice is superior to the objections levelled against it. Public acceptance of hospital corporations,
group medicine and legal aid societies is established. Absent the profit
motive, there is no reason to believe that thfe courts will not be able to
safeguard professional standards, even perhaps to improve them. The
complaint that the courts would lose control over individuals and corporations engaged in professional work if corporations were free to do
so seems superficial in view of the fact that the complaint is most often
found in a judicial opinion enjoining a corporation or reviewing disciplinary action taken by a state administrative agency against an
individual."
Progress has been made in recent years by conferences between bar
associations and trust companies devoted to reaching agreement on the
inevitable joint occupation of the borderland between law practice and
the incidental services of a corporate fiduciary. There is reason to be12 People v. Allied Architects Assn. of Los Angeles, 2oi Cal. 428, 257 P. 51I
(1927); William Messer Co. v. Rothstein, 129 App. Div. 215, 113 N.Y.S. 772
(i9o8); Crall and Ostrander v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 855, 49 S.E. 638 (1905).
" State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers for Florida v. Cooksey, 155,
Fla. 761, 21 S. (zd) 54z (1945); Kendall v. Beiling, 295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W. (2d)
489 (1943).
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lieve that further progress will be made in this respect since the courts
are willing to give effect to such agreements so long as they are reasonable.44 Undoubtedly the medical profession is in the process of
compromising with non-profit group medicine which commands a considerable degree of public acceptance. Development along these lines
may result in definitive legislation which can be administered with
more certainty.
Joseph N. Morency, Jr., S.Ed.

." People ex rel. Committee on Grievances v. Denver Clearing House Banks,
99 Colo. 50, 59 P. (2d) 468 (I9'36).

